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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YOUTH TENNIS FOUNDATION 
OF UTAH, 
Appellant, 
-v-
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO, 14350 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
A sales tax deficiency in the amount of $1,364.8 
together with interest accruing thereon until paid, was as 
sessed against the Youth Tennis Foundation of Utah based u 
on its sale to the public of ticket admissions to a profes 
sional tennis tournament conducted in 1973 at the Special 
Event' s Center, Uni versi ty of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks af-
firmation of its decision upholding the audited sales tax 
deficiency for 1973. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References to the Transcript of Proceedings befo 
• -. '• - 1 - " • • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the State Tax Commission are designated (TR) with page number 
following. References to the remaining record on appeal 
are designated (R) with page number following. References 
to exhibits are designated (E) with the exhibit number fol-
lowing. References to appellant's Brief are designated (AS) 
with page number following. 
The background facts set forth in appellant's Brief 
are substantially correct. However, respondent, Tax Commis-
sion, takes issue with certain factual statements set forth 
in appellant's Brief as not being supported by the evidence 
before the State Tax Commission. 
Appellant challenges paragraph eight of the Conclu-
sions of Law which admits that the 1973 professional tennis 
tournament was similar to other tournaments conducted by the 
Foundation, but, significantly, the '73 tournament charged 
admissions, which none of the others had done, and, hence, 
it was not a "regular" activity of the Foundation. The refer-
ences set forth in appellant's Brief (AB-3), referring to Ex-
hibit No. 6 and pages 25 ,26 and 43 of the Transcript of Pro-
ceedings, show no evidence that the Foundation regularly 
charged admissions to professional tennis tournaments. The 
language is in the terms of "net proceeds" from the conduct 
of the tournament. The only reference having any bearing on 
ticket admissions set forth in appellant's Brief (AB-3) is in 
the form of a question to the witness, Mr. Freed, which is 
-2-
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ambiguous on whether the net proceeds from tennis tourna-
ments were from player entrance fees and ticket admissions. 
(TR-20,21) The State Tax Commission, in rendering its de-
cision, relied upon testimony that tournament income from 
paid admissions by the public was not regularly the way a 
tennis tournament was conducted by appellants (TR-98) 
Mr. Freed, a principal in appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, 
testified in response to questions of whether the appellant 
would have still shown a profit had a sales tax been paid, 
as follows: (TR-98) 
Q: In other words, if you were to pay the sales 
tax as presently assessed in the amount of $1,400 odd-some 
dollars, you would still show a net income for 1973; is that 
correct? 
A: Yes, but you see, we testified earlier that the 
pro tournament would have shown a loss of approximately $100. 
The reason for that is we had other tournaments that were 
profitable that we ran. 
Q: Did you pay sales tax on the other tournaments? 
A: No. There were no admissions. 
Q: What was the source of income from the other 
tournaments? 
A: Entry fees and one of them we held in Las Vegas, 
the big one. 
-3-
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Q: Were you required to pay any kind of sales 
or use or transaction tax for conducting the tournament 
in Las Vegas, Nevada? 
A: No. (TR-98) 
Appellant's references to the nature and extent 
of the Foundation's income and outgo (AB-7) discloses the 
revenue for the past several years (1967 to 1974)* The 
amount set forth of $12,335.48 net as proceeds from tourna-
ments was not specifically clarified in order to determine 
whether the greatest portion of those proceeds was from 
entry fees paid by players and advertising commissions, or 
ticket admissions purchased by the public. 
Appellant correctly sets forth the facts regard-
ing loans from the Youth Tennis Foundation to the Salt Lake 
Swim and Tennis Club and to the Freed Investment Company. 
It should be noted, however, that Mr. Freed testified that 
loans to Freed Investment Company were made to obtain se-
cure, safe and favorable interest income and were not in 
any sense entered into for the benefit of the company. (Freed 
Investment Company). In fact, loans were fixed at a higher 
interest rate than the company would have had to pay at the 
bank and are in that sense donations to the foundation. 
(TR-75) Although not brought forth in the testimony, it was 
believed by the Tax Commission that said Freed Investment 
-4-
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Company deducted an amount for interest payments' expense 
from its corporate income tax to arrive at taxable income 
for Freed Investment' Company. This money for corporate 
interest expense was not paid to any bank or savings insti-
tution but was paid to and accrued to the benefit of ap-
pellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, of which Mr. Freed was 
a principal . 
References in appellant's Statement of Facts 
(AB-4,5) to Article XIII, Section 2, and U.C.A., Section 
59-2-30 and Section 59-2-31, apply to ad valorem property 
taxes and have no relevancy to sales taxes which are statu-
tory excise taxes imposed upon the transaction of buying and 
selling personal property. 
Appellant sets forth in its Brief that regarding 
the conduct of the professional tennis tournament in 1973 
in question herein, thousands of free admission tickets were 
provided to juniors daily. However, appellant does not know 
if any or all of said juniors attended said tournament. 
(TR-111) When questioned whether the benefit to the junior 
players to see world-class tennis players would outweigh the 
loss of receipts from the conduct of the 1973 tennis tourna-
ment, Mr. Freed answered "no". (TR-111) Mr. Freed previously 
testified that if the sales tax is paid as questioned herein, 
the loss to the appellant from the 1973 tennis tournament 
would be $63.58. (TR-5) 
-5- . 
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Other factors were considered by respondent, 
Utah State Tax Commission, as having some bearing upon the 
charitable nature of the conduct of the 1973 professional 
tennis tournament at the University of Utah's Special Event 
Center. Appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, had never ap-
plied for an exemption from sales and use taxes as is re-
quired by Utah law until challenged on the conduct of the 
1973 tennis tournament. (TR-96) There was no separately 
stated price for sales tax on tickets sold to the general 
consuming public who bear the economic and financial bur-
den of paying said sales tax. (TR-96) A professional mana-
ger was hired to promote the tournament and was paid a certain 
percentage of advance ticket sales and advertising commis-
sions. (TR-69) Ticket income amounted to approximately 
$30,801.65, upon which a tax of $1,364.84 was imposed. (TR-5) 
Appellant also testified through Mr. Freed that the Youth 
Tennis Foundation bought and sold equipment for profit (net 
and balls). (TR-52-53) See also Exhibit No. 6 and Exhibit 
No. 7. Mr. Freed also testified that loans were made to 
Freed Investment Company in the following amounts: 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Total 
$ 7,500.00 
7,500.00 
12,500.00 
4,000.00 
5,500.00 
10,500.00 
6,965.74 
6,765.74 
$ 61,231.48 (TR-75) 
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Appellant testified that the rate of interest changed from 
time-to-time, but, at the present time, it was 8 percent. 
The total amount loaned to Freed Investment Company was ap-
proximately $61,231.48, at an interest rate no higher than 
8 percent at any time. (TR-75) 
In 1964, appellant loaned to the Salt Lake Swim 
and Tennis Club the sum of $42,500.00 for a term of 10 years 
with interest at 5 percent per annum. (TR-123,23) An 
additional loan of $12,000.00 has been made in 1973, so that 
the total loan outstanding to the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis 
Club is $54,500.00. (TR-72) No evidence was introduced by 
appellant to suggest that at the time the loan to the Salt 
Lake Swim and Tennis Club was first originated, it was so pro-
tected by an equity valued in excess of the club's obliga-
tion. (TR-23) In fact, appellant stated that at the time 
the loan was first made in 1964, there was still doubt and 
uncertainty expressed as to whether or not the then two-year-
old Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club would be profitable, 
which concern lead to the purchase of insurance by appellant 
for the benefit of the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club on 
the life of David L. Freed. (R-162) Mr. Freed indicated 
that he, from time-to-time, served on the Board of Directors 
of the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club. (R-162) It is ques-
tioned whether there was ever any arms-length transaction be-
tween appellant, Youth Tennis Foundation, and the Freed 
- -7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Investment Company, in which some $61,000.00 was trans-
ferred, and the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club in which 
some $54,500.00 was loaned. 
" ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A SALES TAX IS IMPOSED UPON ADMISSIONS TO 
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT OR RECREA_' 
TION WHICH TAX IS PAID BY THE PUBLIC PUR-
CHASING SAID TICKETS. 
The principal statute in this matter is set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-4, which provides: 
"Excise tax~-Rate.--From and after the 
effective date of this act there is levied 
and there shall be collected and paid: 
•k 'k -k 
(d) A tax equivalent to four percent of 
the amount paid for admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment or recreation.11 
The above statute requires the collection and payment of 
sales tax on "admissions." This Court, in Barrett Invest-
ment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 15 Utah 2d 97, 99, 387 
P.2d 998 (1964), has recognized the collection of sales tax 
on sales of certain services and admissions to places of 
amusement, entertainment or recreation. 
In construing Utah statutes, the following rules 
should apply: 
"Rules of construction as to words and 
phrases.--Words and phrases are to be con-
strued according to the context and the ap-
proved usage of the language; but technical 
words and phrases, and such others as have 
. • - 8 -
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acquired a peculiar and;appropriate meaning 
in law, or are defined by statute, are to 
be construed according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition." 
(Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-11 
(1953)) 
Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain 
words, then words should be read in light of conditions 
and necessities which they are intended to meet and object 
sought to be attained thereby. (United States Smelting, 
Refining' & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 58 U. 
168, 197 P. 902.) Therefore, the above statute should be 
read as intending to impose a sales tax upon the admission 
price to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recrea-
ti on. 
The administration of the sales and use tax is 
vested in the State Tax Commission, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 59-15-20, provides: 
"The administration of this act is vested 
in and shall be exercised by the state tax com-
mission which may prescribe forms and rules and 
regulations in conformity with this act for the 
making of returns and for the ascertainment, as-
sessment and collection of the taxes imposed her 
under." 
Pursuant to the above-cited authority, the Utah State Tax 
Commission has adopted regulations which apply and should 
have been applied by the Foundation regarding the collec-
tion and payment of sales and use tax. The following sale 
tax regulations are pertinent: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. S~2 provides that the nature of the sales 
tax is a transaction tax imposed upon admissions to any 
place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation. The 
purchaser is the actual taxpayer and the vendor is charged 
only with the duty of collecting the tax from the pur-
chaser and paying the tax to the State. 
2. S-23 provides that taxpayers who sell tangible, 
personal property or related services for resale, or to 
exempt customers , are required to keep records verifying 
the nontaxable status of such sales. The burden of proving 
that a sale is for resale or otherwise exempt shall be upon 
the person who makes the sale. (Emphasis added.) 
3. Sales Tax Regulation S-33 provides: 
"Admission defined.--The term1 admission1 
means the right or privilege to enter into a 
place including seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise and other similar accommodations and 
charges made therefor. The amount paid for the 
right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an 
auditorium, theatre, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, 
meeting house or gymnasium to view any type of 
entertainment is taxable. The right to use a 
table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden 
is taxable, whether such charge is designated 
as a cover charge, minimum charge or any such 
similar charge, and the amount paid for such right 
is subject to the tax. This is true whether the 
charge made for the use of the seat, table, or simi-
lar accommodation is combined with an admission 
charge proper to form a single charge, or is 
separate and distinct from an admission charge, 
or is itself the sole charge. 
"Where an original admission charge carries 
the right to remain in a place, or to use a 
-10-
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for an extension of such time, the 
s paid for 'admission' within the 
law. Where a person or organiza-
the sole right to use any place or 
ispose of all the admissions to 
one or more occasions, the amount 
right is not subject to the tax on 
uch a transaction constitutes a 
entire place whether or not it is 
However, if the person or organiza-
ells admissions to the place, the. 
to amounts paid for such admis-
4. S-34 provi des : 
"Place of amusement defined.--The phrase 
'place of amusement, entertainment or recreation' 
is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea 
of a definite location. The amount paid for 
admission to such a place is subject to the tax, 
even though such charge includes the right of 
the purchaser to participate in some activity 
within the place. For example, the sale of a 
ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operate 
device is an admission to a place of amusement." 
Based upon the above-cited statutes and regulations, an 
audited sales tax deficiency has been imposed against the 
admission price to the professional tennis tournament spon-
sored by the appellant. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM 
SALES TAXES AS A CHARITABLE INSTITUTION UNDER 
THE FACTS WHERE THE MOTIVES OF ITS PRINCIPALS 
ARE NOT FREE FROM THE TAINT OF EVERY CONSI-
DERATION THAT IS PERSONAL, PRIVATE OR SELFISH. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-6, provides cer-
tain exemptions from sales tax and states: 
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11
 • . . and all sales made to or by religious 
or charitable institutions in the conduct of the 
regular religious or charitable functions and 
activities; ... shall be exempt from taxation 
under thi s act... ." 
The general rule in the State of Utah is that the 
burden is on the taxpayer claiming exemption from taxation. 
11
. . . An exemption from taxation is never 
presumed but must be expressly and clearly con-
ferred in plain terms and cannot be read into 
the statute. Provisions in a sales tax statute 
granting exemptions from the tax thereby imposed 
are to be strictly construed against the person 
who claims to be exempt under such provisions, 
and in favor of the taxing authority, in the ab-
sence of express legislative intent that the ex-
emption is to be construed otherwise. All 
doubts, or all reasonable doubts, are resolved 
against the exemption... .,! 
(68 Am.Our.2d Sales & Use Taxes, Section 11 pp. 
25-26) 
The initial question appears to be whether or not 
the Foundation is a "charity" within the meaning of the ex-
emption set forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-6. 
The definition of what constitutes a "charity" is difficult. 
One of the definitions suggested by the Court in Staines v. 
Burton, 53 Pac. 1015 (1898), provides that charity is: 
"... whatever is given for the love of 
God, or for the love of your neighbor in the 
Catholic and universal sense,--given from 
these motives and to these ends ,--free from the 
stain or taint of every consideration that is 
personal, private, or selfish."
 N 
(At page 1011T) (Tmphasis added.) 
The facts presented at the formal hearing show that, 
although the Foundation is a nonprofit corporation, organized 
to promote "tennis", other indirect benefits accrued to its 
founders and organizers: 
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1. Revenue of the Foundation has been loaned 
for various personal purposes. Loans totalling some 
$61,231.48 have been loaned to the Freed Investment Company 
at an interest rate not greater than 8 percent. Many times 
the interest rate was below 8 percent. Said loans were not 
really arms-length transactions, and it is doubtful that 
any demand for repayment could not be enforced when Mr. 
David Freed was a principal of appellant and also a princi-
pal owner of Freed Investment Company. If any loans to 
Freed Investment Company were, in fact, in excess of inter-
est loans which could have been obtained from commercial 
banks, which is doubtful, then said interest payments re-
presented an expense item deduction on corporate income tax 
returns of Freed Investment Company, although said interest 
expense accrued to the benefit of the Youth Tennis Founda-
tion of Utah, appellant herein, in which Mr. Freed is a prin-
ci pal . 
2. There were principal loans from appellant to 
the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club, of which Mr. Freed is 
also, or has been, a director, in the total amount of some 
$54,000.00 at 5 percent per annum. Again, there is doubt 
as to whether this is legally enforceable as an arms-length 
transact!on . 
3. One of the actual expense items of appellant 
includes insurance premiums on the life of David L. Freed, 
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which expense ended in 1973. (TR-27, 101, 102) The reasons 
for the insurance are not clear, but it was stated that, if 
David L. Freed died, the loan of the appellant Foundation 
to the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club would be paid off in 
full, with all proceeds going to the Foundation, and none 
to the estate of David L. Freed. (TR-27) It was not clear 
why David L. Freed was liable for the debts of the Salt Lake 
Swim and Tennis Club. 
• •.':• 4 • The Foundation maintains that it purchases 
tennis equipment and balls at wholesale prices for sales 
to local schools at less than retail prices; however, a 
profit is made by the Foundation on said sales. (TR-53,57) 
Certain amounts of tennis equipment were purchased at whole-
sale and stored at the Salt Lake Swim and Tennis Club with 
Mr. David L. Freed and the club manager being the only 
ones having personal access to that equipment. (TR-108,109) 
But, significantly, Mr. Freed testified that he has never 
personally given any of the equipment to any individual , 
junior or otherwise, nor has Mr, Fairclough, the attorney, 
(TR-128) The manager of the Swim and Tennis Club has not 
ever personally given any equipment to any youngster. 
(TR-129) Apparently, the tennis professionals are the only 
ones who have made any distribution. (TR-128) 
It should also be noted that appellant never sought 
an exemption from sales and use tax as a charitable organization 
. -14-
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until at a point in time following the 1973 professional 
tennis tournament at the University of Utah's Special 
Event Center when questioned by sales tax auditors. The 
above-cited U.C.A., Section 59-15-6, granting an exemption 
from sales and use tax is not a self-executing statute, 
but requires that appellant file an application for exemp-
tion , -which, appell ant has failed to do until this proceed-
ing. 
Respondent takes issue with the cases cited by 
appellant, dealing with ad valorem property tax laws as not 
being relevant to establish an exemption from sales taxes, 
which is a statutory excise tax imposed upon the transac-
tion of buying and selling personal property. The ad valor-
em property tax statutes impose certain governmentally set 
mill levies upon property values determined at a fixed as-
sessment levels. The two taxes are basically very different, 
and exemptions set forth in the Utah Constitution and general 
Utah statutes are fundamentally different. Hence, references 
to property tax statutes for determining exemption are imma-
terial and irrelevant. 
Appellant also cites many cases from other juris-
dictions dealing with exemptions for charitable organiza-
tions similar to appellant's organization. It should be 
noted at the outset that there are many varying and differ-
ing statutes throughout the United States, many of which are 
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greatly dissimilar to the Utah sales and use tax statutes. 
Many statutes impose gross proceeds taxes and other trans-
action taxes. References by appellant to cases outside 
cf the jurisdiction of the State of Utah are irrelevant 
unless appellant can show similar sales and use tax statutes, 
exemptions and intent in setting forth exemptions for 
charitable organizations. 
The above-cited facts seem to indicate that ap-
pellant utilizes its financial resources and revenue in a 
manner that is not free from the stain or taint of every 
consideration that is personal, private or selfish. 
POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PROFESSIONAL TENNIS 
TOURNAMENT CHARGING ADMISSIONS TO THE 
CONSUMING PUBLIC IS NOT "REGULAR" WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF U.C.A., SECTION 59-15-6. 
The second aspect of the exemption set forth in 
U.C.A., Section 59-15-6, provides that the charitable ac-
tivities and functions must be "regular." The conduct 
of the professional tennis tournament was similar to other 
tournaments conducted by the Foundation; however, signi-
ficantly, the 1973 professional tournament charged admission 
prices which none of the other tournaments had charged. 
(TR-98) Appellant has failed to submit any evidence or 
clarify on the record before the State Tax Commission whether 
other tournaments had charged admission prices to the con-
suming public, and, if so, how many of those tournaments 
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actually generated revenue from admissions. The amount 
of dollar income from admissions was never presented to 
the State Tax Commission. In fact, appellant, through Mr. 
Freed, testified (TR-9S) that there was no previous sales 
tax on any of the tournaments, because there had been no 
admissions charged. Apparently * .appellant has sponsored 
other professional tennis tournaments and has collected 
entry fees and advertising commissions. The conduct of 
the 1973 professional tennis tournament was not regular in 
terms of income and receipts. (See appellant's Exhibit 
No. 6, 1ines 5 and 6. ) 
In addition to the income irregularity, there were 
other irregularities. The conduct of the professional ten-
nis tournament was not regular in terms of time expended by 
the principals of appellant in its promotion. Appellant 
hired a professional promotor who was entitled to a percent-
age of advanced ticket sales and advertising, which action 
appears to be profit-motivated in nature. 
"Regular" is defined by Black's Law Dictionery, 
Rev. Fourth Edition, at page 1450, as: 
"Steady or uniform in course practice 
or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or 
irrational variation. Regular is also the 
antonym of 'casual' or 'occasional'." 
(Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 
7 P.2d 2 8 4 T 
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Sales Tax Regulation S-43 provides that all sales 
made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the 
conduct of their ,regular religious and charitable functions 
are not subject to sales tax, providing the property so sold 
or purchased is to be used, consumed or sold in carrying 
on the institution's regular reli gi ous or charitable purposes. 
The exemption granted by the statute under this rule does 
not apply to institutions merely operating upon a nonprofit 
basis. Every institution claimin g exemption under this rule 
must obtain from the State Tax Commission an approval of its 
claim for such exemption.. No such prior approval was obtained 
by appellant. 
It is hereby submitted that the 1973 professional 
tennis tournament conducted by appellant was an activity not 
within the regular course of the charitable activites of the 
Youth Tennis Foundation as defined, such as to entitle it to 
exemption from sales tax under Utah statutes and regulations. 
Sales taxes should have been collected and paid on admissions 
to said pro-tennis tournament. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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